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Comments
RIGHTS TO RECOVER UNREASONABLE RATES
UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
RANDY S. BROOKS

Under the Federal Aviation Act (Act),' the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) has the authority to perform such acts, conduct such
investigations, issue and amend such orders, and make such general and specific rules, regulations, and procedures as it deems
necessary, consistent with the provisions of the Act.' Sections
1002(d) through (g) of the Act delimit the CAB's power to
determine and prescribe rates.' Whenever the CAB decides that
rates or fares for either interstate or overseas transportation4 are unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential
or prejudicial, it is authorized to determine and prescribe the lawful
rate or fare to be charged thereafter. In addition, if the CAB finds
that rates for foreign travel are unjustly discriminatory or unduly
preferential or prejudicial, it can alter those rates and order the
carrier to comply with the alteration. Although it must provide
notice and a hearing before prescribing any new rates or fares,"
the CAB can decide that rates or fares are objectionable either on
its own initiative or after receiving a complaint.
In examining and setting rates the CAB must take several
factors into consideration, including the effect of the rates upon
the movement of traffic, the public's interest in low-cost yet adequate and efficient air transportation, quality-of-service standards
which may have been established by law, the advantages of air
transportation, and the need for sufficient revenue to provide adequate and efficient service." In addition, section 404 requires the
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §.§ 1301
et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch.
601, 52 Stat. 973.
'49 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1970).
'49 U.S.C. S 1482(d)-(j) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

" The CAB does not have rate-making authority over intrastate transportation.
'49
'49

U.S.C. S 1482(d)-(f) (1970).
U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
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air carriers to establish just and reasonable rates and prohibits
them from granting preferential treatment or subjecting to unjust

discrimination any person, port, locality, or description of transportation.! Finally, whenever an air carrier files a tariff with the
CAB proposing new rates or fares for either interstate and overseas transportation or foreign transportation, the CAB may, either
after a complaint or on its own initiative, hold a hearing concerning the lawfulness of the new rates. The CAB may suspend the
operation of the proposed tariff for up to 180 days for interstate
and overseas air transportation and up to 365 days for foreign air
transportation, and after the hearing it may take any action that

would have been appropriate had the proceeding occurred after
the rate was already in effect.'
Despite its prospective authority to determine, alter, and suspend
rates, the CAB is not authorized to award a recovery to those
persons who have paid rates which are determined to be either
unlawful or unreasonable." Recent cases involving unreasonable
rates have discussed this absence of authority and present the questions of whether or not such a remedy should exist, and if so,

what form it should take.
749
849

U.S.C. S 1374 (1970).
U.S.C. § 1482(g)-(j) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

"Unlawful rates" are those rates which either vary from the rate schedules
announced in the air carrier's tariffs or are not established in the manner specified
in the Act. An example of this is Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(Moss 1), in which the court held that rates made by the CAB had to comply
with the notice and hearing requirements of §§ 1002(d)-(e) of the Act.
10"Reasonable rates" are not defined in the Act. but in Moss v. CAB, 521
F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966, reh. denied, 425 U.S. 966
(1976) (Moss I1), the court explained that:
Reasonable rates, in this regulated industry as in others, are those
which are as low as possible, but still allow the industry to provide
"adequate and efficient service" and earn a reasonable rate of return, thus assuring its ability to attract necessary capital in the
future. The just and reasonable rate, in short, is the rate at which,
under a given set of economic circumstances, the industry will perform efficiently as that term is defined in the statute.
Id. at 308.
Interestingly, although § 316(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.
316(d) (1970), states that unreasonable rates are also unlawful, nowhere in the
Federal Aviation Act does that statement appear.
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JUDICIAL DISCUSSION

11 involved a violation of section 404(b)
Danna v. Air France
of
the Act,"' which provides that no air carrier shall give any unreasonable preference to any person or subject any person to any
unjust discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed to represent the class
of persons who flew between New York and London or Paris and
who paid more than other passengers because of their age. Two
questions were presented: whether the claim that discrimination
or preference in an air carrier's fares was a violation of section
404(b) was within the primary jurisdiction of the CAB, and
whether, if the CAB found that the fares violated section 404(b),
a private right of action would exist under the Act." The district
court held and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that
claims that tariffs are either unreasonable in amount or unduly
discriminatory in effect must be determined initially by the agency
with which the tariffs are filed.
The district court also held that no remedy would have been
available even if the CAB had determined that the tariff was
violative of section 404(b). The court decided that because the
Act contains no provision for reparation for past acts, no federal
rights of action for such reparations should be implied."' In declining to find an implied right under section 404(b), the court found
it significant that Congress, in the face of CAB requests for such
a reparations provision," had failed to legislate one. The district
court also expressed apprehension that different courts granting
different remedies would undermine the uniform administration of
the Act. The appellate court, however, refused to affirm this part
of the decision, holding that it was unnecessary to decide the question of reparations unless and until the CAB decided that the
tariff was unduly discriminatory.
A second series of decisions also discussed the possibility of
awarding reparations for unreasonable rates and, in addition, described a standard for any recovery that might be allowed. In
11334 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 463 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972).
1249 U.S.C. S 1374(b) (1970).
's

334 F. Supp. at 54.

14 334 F. Supp. at 61.
"5 See [1964] CAB ANN. REP.

16463 F.2d at 408-09.

69-70.
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Moss v. CAB (Moss I),1" several air carriers had filed increased
passenger tariffs with the CAB. Representative John E. Moss
(D-Cal.) and his colleagues protested that the procedure which
the CAB had followed in investigating those tariffs excluded the
public from the rate-making process. In response the CAB suspended the submitted tariffs but in the same order outlined a fare
formula and announced that tariffs which implemented that formula would not be suspended. The carriers withdrew the previous
tariffs and filed new ones based on the CAB's formula, and when
the CAB refused to grant Representative Moss's request to suspend the new tariffs, Moss filed a petition with the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals asking for a review of the
CAB's orders. 8 The court held that the CAB had done all that it
could, short of formally styling its order as rate-making, to induce
the carriers to adopt the proposed rates and that to allow the CAB
to shut out the public by not giving notice, holding hearings, and
taking statutory factors into account was impermissible. 9
Following the court's decision that the rates charged pursuant
to the CAB's initial order were unlawful, seven lawsuits were
filed, each claiming to represent the class which had paid the unlawful rates and seeking to recover the amounts in excess of the
last lawfully established rates. These cases were consolidated in
Weidberg v. American Airlines, Inc.'" The court in Weidberg was
asked by the defendant airlines to stay the actions until the CAB
was able to establish whether the rates that had been charged were
unjust and unreasonable as well as unlawful. Plaintiffs, however,
claimed that they were entitled to recover not merely the unreasonable portion of any rates paid, but also any amount which exceeded
the lawful rates.2' In finding for the defendants, the court relied
on Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Florida," a United States
Supreme Court case in which Justice Cardozo rejected a similar
claim to recover all amounts in excess of the last lawfully estab17430

F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

"The petition was filed pursuant to § 1006 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486
(1970).
22

430 F.2d at 902.

20 336 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Ill.1972).
21 336 F. Supp. at 409.
22

295 U.S. 301 (1935).
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lished rates.
In Atlantic Coast Line, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) had established rates for freight carriers. Pursuant to a
determination that the rates were procedurally defective, several
shippers sought to recover the amounts by which the rates exceeded
lawful rates. Rejecting their claim, the Supreme Court held that
an action for restitution of money was- an equitable action and that
to make the carriers return the money the plaintiffs must show that
"a fixed and certain duty has been laid upon a court of equity
to make the carrier pay the price of the blunders of the commerce
board in drawing up its findings."23 The Weidberg court found that
the decisive element in Atlantic Coast Line was the reasonableness
of the rate schedule; accordingly, it granted a stay in the proceedings until the CAB had finished its investigation into the reasonableness of the rates.' Like the Second Circuit in Danna, it ruled
that a decision regarding the existence of an implied federal right
of action must await a determination of unreasonableness by the
CAB. 25
Following the Weidberg decision, Representative Moss and
some colleagues sought review of the CAB's determination that
the rates were in fact not unjust or unreasonable in Moss v. CAB
(Moss II)." Again, petitioners claimed that the right to recover
passenger fares did not depend upon their having been "unreasonable," but could be predicted solely on their having exceeded the
last preceding fares that were lawfully established. They also
claimed that even if recovery were limited to the "unreasonable"
portion of the rates, the CAB had erred in its determination and
that even if the general fare levels were not "unreasonable," those
passengers who had paid "unjustly discriminatory rates" should
be granted recovery. The Moss I court noted that no explicit right
of recovery existed in the Act and then turned to other statutory
schemes to see what standards for recovery had been used in
similar cases.
Examining Atlantic Coast Line and other cases arising under
2Id. at 314.
336 F. Supp. at 414.

"2Id.at 412-13.
" Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 U.S. 966.
See generally Note, 42 J. Am L. & CoM. 639 (1976).
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the Interstate Commerce Act," the court found, like the Weidberg
court, that equitable principles governed actions for restitution and
that the reasonableness of rates was a prime determinant.28 The
Moss H court also examined the reparations provision of the
Natural Gas Act, " cases involving the remedial authority of the
Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, " and United States v.
Morgan"' (involving an order of the Secretary of Agriculture reducing stockyard rates to a just and reasonable level), and concluded that, at the least, unreasonable rates must be found by the
CAB before a recovery might be granted and that equitable considerations might prevent recovery even where fares exceeded what
was just and reasonable.2 The court then found both that the
CAB's determination of reasonableness was proper and that the
CAB had correctly focused its decision on the types of equitable
factors which might prevent a recovery in any case." In response
to plaintiffs' charge of unjust discrimination, the court decided that
the carriers were acting in direct response to what the CAB considered to be lawful and therefore that no recovery was warranted."'
The Moss H court, by proposing a standard for recovery, seemingly presupposed an underlying right to recover; this right, however, has not been conceded by other courts. For example, the
district court in Danna carefully studied the question and held
not only that section 404(b) did not create an implied federal
right of action," but also that the absence of a reparations provision in the Act precluded any common-law cause of action. 8
Subsequently the Weidberg court, while not going so far as to
exclude a right of recovery, clearly maintained that the absence
of a reparations provision was one that would have to be re2749

U.S.C. 51(5), 3(1), 8, 9 (1970).

28521 F.2d at 304.

15 U.S.C. § 717(e) (1970).
The Metropolitan Area Transit Commission for a time oversaw the operation of a transit company in the District of Columbia area. See 521 F.2d at 306.
31307 U.S. 183 (1939).
21
20

521 F.2d at 308.

Id. at 314. Specifically, the court found that the carriers had not received
It
excessive and unlawful returns from the fare level, and that there was no fund
of net enrichment from which restitution could appropriately be made.
24

Id.

1334
F. Supp. at 61.
0
1d. at 63.
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solved before any recovery could be granted."' The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, refused to affirm the district court's
ruling in Danna, claiming that it was premature,"' and the Moss II
court left the distinct impression that it might find an implied
right of action if a plaintiff meeting the court's standard for recovery should appear before the court.
The Moss II court recognized that, like the Federal Aviation
Act, the motor carriers' portion of the Interstate Commerce Act
had been passed without a reparations provision and that in
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United State?' that lack had been held to preclude recovery by payers of unreasonable motor carrier rates. The
Moss II court's interpretation of T.I.M.E. was a very narrow one,
however, limiting it solely to a situation where the claim was made
by way of a defense in an action against a carrier who had sought
to collect properly filed and unchallenged rates. In addition, the
Moss II court qualified the T.I.M.E. decision by mentioning that
in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc.' the Supreme
Court held, over the objections of T.I.M.E.'s author, Justice Harlan, that common-law remedies that were consistent with the
regulatory scheme could survive the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act."1
The Moss II court implied that it believed a remedy might exist
under the Federal Aviation Act. The court noted that in cases involving the Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, the governing
statute contained no provision for recovery of excessive rates, and
yet the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had
held that the transit company could not retain rates collected
pursuant to an improperly authorized fare increase, but must
utilize the amount collected for the benefit of the class who paid
it.' The Moss II court's cryptic statement that the standard for
recovery precludes relief to the plaintiffs-"at least at this stage
31336 F. Supp. at 412-13.

3 463 F.2d at 408-09.
39359 U.S. 464 (1959). T.I.M.E., Inc. was an interstate carrier which had
charged, pursuant to a tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, a
rate which the United States claimed was unreasonable.

40371 U.S. 84 (1962).
4' 521 F.2d at 305.
4Id.

at 306.
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of the proceedings'"-seemingly indicates that the court believed
that a remedy does exist somewhere.
Despite these inferences, no recovery has yet been granted to
any persons who might have been subjected to unjust discrimination
or who might have had to pay unjust and unreasonable rates or
fares. Presumably the courts will eventually find such a plaintiff
and will have to decide whether a recovery should be granted and,
if so, what type it should be. An examination of the remedies that
have been developed in analogous non-aviation situations furnishes a basis for discussing appropriate aviation remedies.
REMEDIES DEVELOPED IN NON-AVIATION SITUATIONS

The question of what types of remedies might be available to
recover unreasonable or discriminatory rates has been discussed
in several non-aviation contexts, and especially in cases arising
under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA)." Three types of remedies in particular have been considered: a common-law right of
restitution, a reparations provision within the statute, and the conditioning of certificates of convenience upon the refund of unreasonable rates.
A. Remedies Under the Statute
The ICA is the basic statute regulating transportation in the
United States. It is administered by the ICC and is composed of
four parts, regulating railroads and pipe line carriers," motor carriers," water carriers," and freight forwarders," respectively. Part
I of the ICA,' pertaining to railroads, contains the most elaborate
provisions relating to the recovery of unreasonable and discriminatory charges. Section 1(5) provides that all charges shall be
43

d. at 304.
-49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 301-27, 901-23, 1001-22, 1231-40 (1970 & Supp. V.
1975).
'Interstate Commerce Act §§ 1-24, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
"Interstate Commerce Act 5§ 201-27, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
41

Interstate Commerce Act §§301-23, 54 Stat. 929 (1940), as amended, 49

U.S.C. §5 901-23 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
41

Interstate Commerce Act §§ 401-22, 56 Stat. 284 (1942), as amended, 49

U.S.C. §5 1001-22 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
4949

U.S.C. 55 1-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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just and reasonable and that every unjust and unreasonable charge
is unlawful." Section 2 declares that if any carrier charges any

persons more or less than it charges any other person it is guilty of
unlawful discrimination," and section 3 declares that any undue
preference or prejudice in the treatment of persons or localities
is also unlawful."'

Sections 8, 9, and 16 set forth the remedies which are available
under Part I of the ICA." Carriers performing any of the above

unlawful acts are liable to the person injured for the full amount
of the damages sustained," and the person claiming to be damaged

may either make a complaint to the ICC or file suit in any United
States District Court." If a complaint is brought before the ICC,
the ICC has the authority to set damages and direct the carrier
to pay the injured person." Interestingly though, since 1916 the

ICC has maintained that since its awards of reparation are only
prima facie evidence in court of the right to recover and carriers
who fail to comply with the ICC orders must be sued in United
States District Courts," the power to award reparations should be
vested exclusively in the courts." Courts have held since Texas &
Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co."' that the question
of the reasonableness of rates was within an administrative agency's
exclusive primary jurisdiction;" however, the ICC has claimed that

50°49

U.S.C. § 1(5) (1970).

5149 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
549 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970).
"349 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 16 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
-49 U.S.C. § 8 (1970). For a discussion of the damages that may be recovered, see Comment, 45 TEx. L. REv. 984 (1967).
"49 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
"49 U.S.C. § 16(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5749 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975): "If a carrier does not comply
with an order for the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the
complainant ... may file in tthe district court of the United States . . . a complaint setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages, and the order
of the Commission in the premises."
"130 ICC ANN. REP. 75-78 (1916).
9204 U.S. 426 (1907). "[A] shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the
unreasonableness of the established rate must, under the act to regulate commerce, primarily invoke redress through the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which body alone is vested with power originally to entertain proceedings for
the alteration of an established schedule, because the rates fixed therein are unreasonable ..
" Id. at 448.
" The doctrine of exclusive primary jurisdiction is founded on the principle

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

130

[43:121

it should not have to make that determination until a lawsuit is
filed seeking damages based on the unlawful rates. In any event,
under Part I of the ICA, shippers who had paid unreasonable or
discriminatory charges could rely on a statutory remedy.
Part II of the ICA, the Motor Carriers Act,"' has a very different
history. When Part II was enacted in 1935, although it declared
the charging of unjust or unreasonable rates or the subjecting of
any person to undue preference or prejudice to be unlawful," it
did not contain any provision under which a person injured thereby
could recover damages. Accordingly, the ICC began to fashion a
remedy, beginning with W. A. Barrows Porcelain Enamel Co. v.
Cushman Motor Delivery Co.,"3 and culminating in Bell Potato
Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line," in which the ICC announced
what it believed to be the proper procedure for an injured shipper
to follow. According to the ICC, the shipper should file an action
in a United States District Court which would stay the suit pending
reference of administrative questions such as reasonableness to the
ICC. A complaint would then be filed with the ICC, and the ICC
would determine the justness, reasonableness, or otherwise unlawfulness of the rate in question. The ICC would then issue an order
which would be used by the court in formulating its judgment.'
In T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States," however, the Supreme Court
held that the fact that unreasonable rates were unlawful did not in
itself create a cause of action for the recovery of unreasonable past
rates and that despite a "saving clause" stating that rights not inconsistent with the statute were not extinguished,"' no common-law
right to recover unreasonable past charges survived the passage of
the Motor Carrier Act."
that "a court normally should not act upon subject matter that is peculiarly
within the agency's specialized field without taking into account what the agency
has to offer." K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 374 (3d ed. 1972).

149 U.S.C. § 301-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
6249

63

U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

11 M.C.C. 365 (1939).

-43 M.C.C. 337 (1944).
"Meiklejohn, Reparations and Overcharges Under Part II of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 19 AD. L. REv. 203, 211 (1966).
-0359 U.S. 464 (1959).

U.S.C. S 316(j) (1970).
61 359 U.S. at 471, 474.
6749
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As a result of ICC recommendations that Congress amend Part
II of the ICA to circumvent T.I.M.E.," Public Law 89-1710 was
passed, providing a reparations procedure. The amendment did
not institute the elaborate procedure used in Part I; rather, it
simply re-established the procedures available before T.I.M.E.
Section 204a(2) approved actions at law for reparation,' 1 and
section 204a(5) defined reparations to include those damages
which the ICC finds to have resulted from unjust and unreasonable
or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial
charges."2 A study of Part II of the ICA thus reveals two things:
that a less elaborate reparations procedure than that established in
Part I exists; and that in the absence of a statutory provision for
recovery, the Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to
allow claims based on an implied federal right.
B. Common-Law Right of Restitution
The decision in T.1.M.E. did not preclude all common-law
rights of recovery under the ICA, as is demonstrated by the subsequent Supreme Court case, Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern
Freight-Way, Inc.'" Hewitt-Robins involved a shipper's claim for
recovery of unreasonable rates caused by a carrier shipping goods
over a more expensive interstate route rather than a less expensive
intrastate route. Utilizing the procedure advocated by the ICC, the
shipper brought its claim in federal district court, which stayed
the proceedings pending an ICC investigation into the reasonableness of the practice. The ICC found the practice unreasonable
under section 216(d) of the Motor Carrier Act, ' but the district
court, basing its decision on T.I.M.E., dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the statute neither created a remedy for reparation nor preserved one at common law." The Second Circuit
"1 See, e.g., 75 ICC ANN. REP. 192 (1961).
7079

Stat. 648, 651 (1965), 49 U.S.C. § 304a (1970). The reparations proce-

dure in Part III resembles that of Part I (49 U.S.C. S 908 (1970)); Part IV re-

sembles Part 11 (49 U.S.C. S 1006a (1970)).
7149 U.S.C. § 304a(2) (1970).
7249 U.S.C. § 304a(5) (1970).

73371 U.S. 84 (1962).
'Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 302 I.C.C. 173 (1957).
-49
U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970).
7
Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 722
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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Court of Appeals affirmed the decision," also on the basis of
T.I.M.E., but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that T.I.M.E.
notwithstanding, the passage of the Act did not extinguish all common-law remedies for reparation.M

The Supreme Court based its conclusion on the fact that a recovery for damages caused by misrouting was not inconsistent
with the statutory scheme of regulation. The Court admitted that
the question of reasonableness was within the ICC's primary jurisdiction but ruled that that did not compel the conclusion that the
courts were without power to award damages. The facts that a
misrouting claim did not jeopardize the stability of tariffs, that
allowing misrouting actions would have a deterrent effect on the
use of misrouting practices, and that without such an action,
shippers would have no remedy, all buttressed the Court's conclusion. The Court distinguished T.I.M.E., explaining that shippers
were already protected against unreasonable rates, both by the
fact that carriers had to give 30 days notice before changing
tariffs," thus giving shippers time to object, and by the ICC's
power to suspend rates for seven months pending an investigation
of those rates." The Supreme Court thus distinguished the cases
on the effect of the exercise of the remedy upon the statutory
scheme of regulation. According to section 216(j),"' if the remedy
is inconsistent with that scheme it does not survive."
Recently, in Cort v. Ash,"3 a case involving the Federal Elections
Campaign Act, the Supreme Court proposed a four-factor test
to determine whether a private remedy is implicit in a federal
statute not expressly providing one. In Cort, the Court explained
that the relevant factors are (1) whether the plaintiff is one of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was created, (2)
whether there is any indication of legislative intent either to create
or deny such a remedy, (3) whether it is consistent with the under"' Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 293 F.2d 205 (2d Cir.
1961).
78 371 U.S. at 89.

7"49 U.S.C. S 317(c) (1970).

U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970).
U.S.C. § 316(j) (1970): "Nothing in this section shall be held to extinguish any remedy or right of action not inconsistent herewith."
8 371 U.S. at 89.
"3422 U.S. 66 (1975).
8049
8149

1977]

COMMENTS

lying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff, and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law." Applying the Cort v. Ash test to
T.I.M.E. and Hewitt-Robins, it appears that the third factor, consistency with the legislative scheme, is the relevant one and that
the Court could easily reach the same results again.
It seems clear, then, that the survival of a common-law right to
reparation in the face of an apparently complete statute such as
the ICA depends upon its relation to that statute. Some of the
factors which the Supreme Court has considered include whether
an aggrieved party is already protected by the statute, whether the
remedy would disrupt the administration of the statute, whether
allowing the remedy would promote the purposes of the statute,
and whether additional remedies are precluded by the statute itself,
have been supplemented and perhaps replaced by the factors
mentioned in Cort. Finally, the existence of the remedy will be
determined in a statute-by-statute manner.
C. Certificates of Convenience and Necessity
Besides a statutory provision in the Federal Aviation Act or a
common-law right to recover, a third way in which restitution of
unreasonable rates might be provided for is the conditioning of
certificates of convenience and necessity. Under a number of
statutes, including the Federal Aviation Act, companies desiring
to commence business must obtain certificates from the appropriate
administrative agency before doing so. " The agency is authorized
to attach conditions to its certificate. The provision in the Act
states: "[Tlhere shall be attached to the exercise of the privileges
granted by the certificate, or amendment thereto, such reasonable
terms, conditions, and limitations as the public interest may require.t'
How broad Congress intended the agencies' powers to be under
"422 U.S. at 78.
'See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 717e, 717f (1970) (Natural Gas Act; 47 U.S.C. §
214 (1970) (Federal Communications Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1970) (Interstate Commerce Act, Part I (Railroads)); 49 U.S.C. 5 306 (1970) (Interstate
Commerce Act, Part H (Motor Carriers)); 49 U.S.C. § 909 (1970) (Interstate
Commerce Act, Part III (Water Carriers)); 49 U.S.C. S 1371(a) (1970) (Federal Aviation Act).
"49 U.S.C. S 1371(e)(1) (1970).
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these certificate-conditioning provisions is not known; the issue
received little or no attention in any of the legislative histories of
the respective acts." The few cases involving the issue, however,
show a willingness on the part of the courts to give the clauses a
broad construction. In ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc.,"
two unions petitioned the ICC to condition the granting of a
certificate authorizing a railroad to abandon certain lines on
the implementation of a benefit program for the workers that
would be displaced by the abandonment. The ICC protested that
such a condition was beyond its power, but the Supreme Court
declared that if abandonment of a line was to be considered in
light of the public interest there was nothing in the ICA to prevent the ICC from considering the effect of unemployment caused
by the abandonment.89 In United States v. Rock Island Motor
Transit Co.,"° the Supreme Court held that a condition authorizing
the ICC to impose subsequent restrictions on a carrier gave the
ICC the power to later prohibit the carrier from operating on
certain routes.
In FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co.," the Supreme Court approved
an act of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) conditioning a
permanent certificate upon the requirement that a natural gas producer refund excessive amounts that were collected under a previous certificate. This was in spite of the fact that sections 4 and 5
of the Natural Gas Act,"' which require the FPC to determine the
reasonableness of rates and allow it to hold hearings and postpone
increases, are strictly prospective in effect.
These cases indicate that the power to condition certificates of
convenience and necessity may be limited only by considerations
of the public interest and the purposes of the particular statute.
While it might seem that conditions imposed in these certificates
should be restricted to matters of secondary importance, i.e., that
areas of significance should be expressly provided for by Congress,
the Supreme Court has not felt bound by such a limitation. Nor
8
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88315 U.S. 373 (1942).

"I1d. at 376-77.
-340 U.S. 419 (1951).
91391 U.S. 9 (1968).
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has it restricted the agencies to measures specifically authorized by
the statutes, and at least in Sunray, the Court has gone so far as
to expand the authority of the agency.
In summary, then, it appears that three types of remedies might
be available to those claimants who have been injured by unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory rates charged pursuant to tariffs
properly filed under the Federal Aviation Act. Congress might
amend the Act with a reparation provision, enacting procedures
similar either to those in Part I or Part II of the ICA. A commonlaw remedy for reparation might exist if it were able to meet the
requirements enumerated in T.I.M.E., Hewitt-Robins, and Cort v.
Ash. Finally, the CAB might be able to amend the certificates of
public necessity and convenience air carriers are required to file
before they can engage in air transportation, conditioning the
certificates upon the refund of the unreasonable rates.
APPLICABILITY OF REMEDIES TO

CAB

Before examining these three remedies in the context of possible
application to the CAB, some preliminary issues must be discussed.
The threshold question is, of course, whether or not there should
be any recovery for unreasonable charges. Perhaps not allowing a
recovery strikes a balance between the carrier and the passengerseven though passengers may have had to pay unreasonable rates,
there are times when the carrier has been forced to collect unreasonably low rates. This situation occurs, for example, when a
carrier files a new tariff under section 403(a) 3 and yet cannot
charge the higher fares until at least thirty days have passed."
Even then the CAB has authority to suspend the rates for up to
180 days while it determines the lawfulness of the rates.9 Further,
the absence of a reparation provision might encourage challenges
to rate increases when initially filed, thus providing even more protection to passengers, who might not have thought it worthwhile
to sue for reparations, but who will benefit from never having had
to pay unreasonable rates in the first place." In addition, rates
U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
"49 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1970).
149 U.S.C. S 1482(g) (1970).
"Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 217 (1959). Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d 298, 302
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (Moss II).
9349
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which go into effect unchallenged may acquire a type of de facto
reasonableness that should not be easily challenged; however, this
argument may also be persuasive in favor of recovery if the only
reason the rates became effective was because the suspension
period expired before any challenge to the rates was made.
Turning to the Act itself for guidance, section 102"" details
certain goals the CAB is instructed to consider as being in the
public interest and in accord with public convenience and necessity. One of these is the regulation of air transportation so as to
foster sound economic conditions in that transportation," which implies that any remedy, such as restitution, that would undoubtedly
cost air cariers more money would hinder those conditions and
therefore not be in the public interest.
This concern of the CAB is counterbalanced, however, by
another ideal, the promotion of "adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust
discriminations, [or] undue preferences or advantages . . . ."" This
mandate certainly seems clear enough to encompass the promotion
of reasonable fares through the deterrent effect of a recovery for
unreasonable ones, and indeed, if the only equity on the side of the
carriers is the fact that the rates were not challenged when initially
filed, the restoration to passengers of moneys they should not have
had to pay seems very desirable.
An additional argument favoring a remedy is that, since the
standard for recovery expressed in Moss II includes and depends
on equitable considerations, some provision for recovery should
be developed to enforce those equities when they point to a recovery. On balance, it seems clear that a remedy of some sort is
warranted. The question then becomes which of the three remedies
proposed is most appropriate.
A. Common-Law Action for Restitution
The easiest remedy to implement would be a common-law action
for restitution. Such an action would be based on traditional legal
principles rather than a questionable statutory interpretation, and
9749

U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).

9849 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1970).

9949 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970).
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it would not require any amending of the Act. Employing the test
of Cort v. Ash, the relevant factors seem to be whether there is
any indication of legislative intent either to create or deny a private right of action, and whether it would be consistent with the
underlying purposes of the statute to imply such a remedy."' There
is no direct evidence of legislative intent in the omission of a reparations provision in the Act; however, evidence exists which indicates that the omission may have been intentional. Since 1962, the
CAB has been petitioning Congress for a reparations provision.!"
Typical of the CAB's recommendations, is: "The Civil Aeronautics
Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Act be amended so as
to make air carriers and foreign air carriers liable for the payment
of damages to persons injured by them as a result of charges col-

lected . . . in violation of section 403 or 404 of the Act."1 2

Especially in light of the amendment in 1965 to the Motor Carrier
Act, giving the ICC that same reparations authority,"*' it seems
significant that Congress has not passed such an amendment to
the Federal Aviation Act. It has been argued, however, that the
amendment to the Motor Carrier Act was a direct response to
T.I.M.E., whereas the courts have never directly denied a similar
common-law remedy with respect to the Federal Aviation Act.1 '
If that argument is valid, then the existence of a common-law action under the Act depends upon the consistency factor of Cort
v. Ash-in effect, whether the situation is more like T.I.M.E. or
more like Hewitt-Robins.
The comparison of the Motor Carrier Act and the two cases
decided under it to the Federal Aviation Act is an obvious one and
was employed both in Danna°1 and in Moss II," although with
different implications. On its face, T.I.M.E. seems to dispose of
the matter, since it involved the very question involved here, i.e.,
recovery of unreasonable, although lawfully filed, rates. Under
both statutes, there is a thirty-day waiting period before new rates
100 422 U.S. at 78.
11 [1962] CAB ANN. REP. 6.
102[1964] CAB ANN. REP. 69-70.
1'3 See note 66 supra.

Danna v. Air Fr., 334 F. Supp. 52, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
102Id. at 58-62.

106 521 F.2d at 305.
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become effective;' 7 under both statutes the agency involved can
suspend proposed rates pending an investigation into their lawfulness;" 8 and perhaps most importantly, under both statutes, permitting a court to rule on the reasonableness of rates or continually
to require the agency to do so would undercut the stability of the
rate structure which the statutory procedures were designed to
promote.''
Nevertheless, two particular distinctions between the statutes
should be noted, one strengthening the argument that Congress
may not have believed a statutory provision necessary in the Federal Aviation Act, and one supporting the proposition that Congress might not have intended for a remedy to be implied. The
first distinction is that the "saving clause" in the Federal Aviation
Act is much broader than that in the Motor Carrier Act. Instead
of merely providing that consistent remedies are not extinguished,"'
the clause in the Federal Aviation Act reads: "Nothing contained
in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
chapter are in addition to such remedies.'"" This was a distinction
noticed by the district court in Danna,'" which nonetheless denied
a common-law remedy by relying on Texas & Pacific Railway,"'
which held that a saving clause virtually identical to the one in the
Federal Aviation Act did not preserve a common-law remedy to
recover an unreasonable freight charge."' Nor is there any legislative history to indicate that Congress thought that the difference in
the two clauses is significant. The second distinction, the one
strengthening the presumption against a common-law right, is that
whereas Part II of the ICA expressly declares that unreasonable
rates are unlawful,"' thus seemingly creating a right, the Federal
10749 U.S.C. § 317(c) (1970)
(Interstate Commerce Act); 49 U.S.C. §
1373(c) (1970) (Federal Aviation Act).
10849 U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970)
(Interstate Commerce Act); 49 U.S.C. S
1482(g) (1970) (Federal Aviation Act).
1'"371 U.S. at 87.
11049 U.S.C. § 316(j) (1970).
"49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970).

334 F. Supp. at 59.
"'204 U.S. 426 (1907).
", Id. at 446-47.

"49

U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970).
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Aviation Act has no such provision. The conclusion, based on
Congress' apparently intentional omission of a reparation provision
despite the CAB's entreaties, the relevance of the T.I.M.E. rationale, and the instability that such a remedy would create in the rate
structure, must be that no common-law right to restitution for
unreasonable rates should exist.
B. Certificatesof Convenience and Necessity
A procedure which might be more consistent with the provisions
of the Act is the conditioning of certificates of public necessity and
convenience upon the refund of unreasonable rates. The CAB may
attach to the exercise of the privilege granted by the certificate such
terms, conditions, and limitations as the public interest may require,"' and it may do so either upon issuing the certificate or at
any time it feels the public convenience and necessity might so
warrant.11 ' If, as was concluded earlier, the public interest includes
the promotion of reasonable rates," ' then there appears to be no
reason why such a refund condition is not appropriate. Indeed, in
19
Sunray,"
the Supreme Court upheld an order of the FPC providing
for refunds in such a manner, in spite of an express lack of authority to do so directly. Traditionally, the conditions upon which certificates have been issued have pertained to the routes to be
travelled by the carrier1 " or the type of service to be provided,"
but the only express limitation on the CAB is that the certificate
may not restrict the carrier's right to add or change schedules,
equipment, accommodations, and facilities. 2
Since there does not seem to be any restriction on the CAB's
ability to condition the certificates on the refund of unreasonable
rates, the important considerations are how appropriate it is for the
11649 U.S.C. S 1372(e)(1)

(1970).

11-749 U.S.C. § 1372(g) (1970).
118 49

U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970).

119391 U.S. 9 (1968).

120 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 967 (1960) (CAB restricted hearing to needs of cities
within geographic boundaries); also City of Dallas v. CAB, 221 F.2d 501 (D.C.

Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 914 (1955) (CAB specified which airport would
best serve area).
" See, e.g., Southern Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 498 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1974)

(CAB restricted carrier to two-stop service).
11 49 U.S.C. 5 1371(e)(4) (1970).
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CAB to regulate in this manner and how effective such a condition
would be in implementing the purposes underlying a rate recovery.
More specifically, the question of appropriateness turns on whether
the CAB should be able to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
The Supreme Court's answer with regard to the FPC was yes," 3
but there is an indication that the CAB may not be quite so unrestricted. In Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 4 the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals refused to let the CAB do
through rate-making.. something it could not do through a certificate of public necessity and convenience-namely, regulate carrier accommodations. " Although Continental was the converse
of the situation under analysis-the direct action was conditioning
certificates of necessity and the indirect action was rate regulation-it is an example of the challenge that might arise were
certificates conditioned on refunds of unreasonable rates.
The second question is how effective such a refund condition
would be. In a situation like Sunray,'" involving a seller of natural
gas, it is not difficult to locate the purchasers who are to receive
the refunds. The possibility of locating and reimbursing each passenger who paid an unreasonable fare over a period that might
well extent over several years, however, is so remote that it would
probably not be considered. One solution, though, is the idea used
in the Metropolitan Area Transit Commission cases."' In those
cases, too, the futility of trying to locate the aggrieved passengers
was realized, so the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered the Commission to create a fund to be used for the benefit
of the class who had paid the fares."' The Transit Commission
cases are particularly appropriate in the context of the Federal
Aviation Act, since neither the District of Columbia Code under
which the Commission operated nor the Federal Aviation Act
authorizes reparations for unreasonable rates.
1

2 FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 US. 9 (1968).
124522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

12 CAB Order No. 73-6-4 (June 1, 1973).
2Id.
at 115.
127391 U.S. 9 (1968).

12E.g., Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm., 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
121Id. at 203-04.
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C. Statutory Amendment
The remedy which would seem to provide the most direct relief
and most closely conform to the purposes of the Act is one which
Congress, intentionally, inadvertently, or temporarily, has failed
to include-namely, a statutory provision for reparation of unreasonable charges. Such a solution avoids both the problem of a
common-law remedy, i.e., interference with the stability of the rate
structure by the courts, and the difficulties involving conditioning
certificates of convenience, i.e., indirect regulation and returning
the unreasonable fares to those who paid them. Assuming that
reparation for unreasonable rates is desirable, a reparation provision in the Act is certainly the most appropriate remedy. The
main question then becomes what type of amendment would be
best.
Several factors should be considered in designing the statute. As
the Moss II court concluded, equitable considerations---including
the reasonableness of the rates, rather than the mere exceeding of
the last lawfully established rates, have set the standard for recovery in those acts which do provide a remedy."' There is no
reason, though, why a statute could not provide for the recovery
of all sums in excess of the last lawful rates; in fact, the dissenters
in Atlantic Coast Line suggested precisely that measure of damages."' Moreover, since section 403 (b) of the Act1 prohibits carriers from charging or collecting any rates other than those filed in
its currently effective tariff, it would not be too onerous to require
the carriers to repay any excess they collect. Were such a recovery
permitted, however, the Act would be the only statute regulating
interstate commerce to allow it, and since the question of rates in
excess of the last lawfully established rates has been caused most
frequently by procedural errors on the part of the respective
agencies it does seem harsh to make the carrier pay the price of
the blunder of the agency.' Fairness is better served when equitable considerations determine the recovery.
Another, more procedural, question is whether the reparation
10 521 F.2d at 307-08.
131 295 U.S. at 319.
13249 U.S.C. S 1373(b) (1970).
133E.g., Atlantic Coast Line, T.I.M.E., and Moss I1.

14295

U.S. at 314.
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process should be under the jurisdiction of the CAB or the courts.
The ICA has both types of provisions in its various Parts; Part I
authorizes complaints before the ICC as well as suits in court,'"'
while Part II contemplates only actions at law.' Even under Part
I, though, the ICC prefers that the actual power to award the
reparations be vested solely in the courts, "' subject to a determination by the ICC that the rates charged were unreasonable. Since
orders of the ICC that were not complied with had to be enforced
by the complainant in district court, 3' the ICC argued that its
docket would be reduced considerably if all cases involving reparations began in court.' 9 This reasoning is persuasive; the CAB has
no more enforcement authority than the ICC,' ° and the only CAB
order which is not reviewable by the courts is one which is reviewable by the President.' It is also the procedure that has been
followed in aviation cases-most specifically in Weidberg v. American Airlines, Inc., " wherein the court ordered a stay in the proceedings pending a CAB investigation into the reasonableness of
the rates charged.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Aviation Act is an anomaly-the only statute regu-

lating carriers in interstate commerce that does not have any provision for reparation or restitution of unreasonable rates and fares.
Obviously, the most direct way to remedy that situation would be
for Congress to amend the Act to contain a reparation procedure.
An appropriate provision would allow complainants to file an
action at law to recover unreasonable or unduly discriminatory
rates, such action to be stayed pending a finding by the CAB of
unreasonableness or discrimination. This would both preserve the
roles of the court and the CAB and further the desired goal of
reaching an equitable solution.
1-49 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
1149 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1) (1970).
See, e.g., 33 ICC ANN. REP. 53 (1919).
3'49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
"'See, e.g., 30 ICC ANN. REP. 7578 (1916).
14049 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970).
"

14149 U.S.C. § 1452 (1970).

11 336 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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The fact that Congress has failed to amend the Act in spite of
CAB recommendations hardly indicates that no recovery is intended, especially in light of the congressional response of T.I.M.E.;
it is probably more an observation that the question of rate recovery seldom arises in aviation and possibly a congressional belief
that a common-law remedy in aviation was not precluded by
T.I.M.E. Courts, however, are more likely to focus on the analogous reasoning of T.I.M.E. to find that a common-law remedy is
inconsistent with the Federal Aviation Act as well as the ICA.
Even reasoning based on the four-factor test of Cort v. Ash is
likely to result in the conclusion that a common-law right of recovery is inconsistent with the Act. The CAB's authority to condition the terms of carriers' certificates of convenience and necessity
seems to provide a possible remedy, but even if a way could be
found to return the fares to those who paid them, there is something dissatisfying about using a power designed to establish routes
to regulate rates instead. Congress' apparent decision that the issue
does not require immediate attention may be correct; however, that
is a bad reason to leave the public with only the prospect of a
judicially-contrived remedy, especially when the proper one, a
statutory amendment, is so apparent.

